This paper studies the incentives for …rms and unions to establish pro…t sharing contracts as a strategic instrument in a Cournot product market oligopoly with decentralized and centralized wage bargaining. Therefore, we examine the stability of these institutional arrangements and show that unions and …rms collectively prefer classical wage contracts. However, under decentralized wage bargaining individual …rms and unions have incentives to replace classical wage contracts by pro…t sharing agreements. Under a centralized wage bargaining system semi-collusion-where …rms collude over the form of the labor contract but set product market quantities in a competitive fashion-is externally and internally stable. It can be shown that …rms do not have incentives to deviate to negotiate separate …rm-level wages unless pro…t-sharing is feasible. Hence, the possibility to conclude pro…t-sharing agreements can destabilize the so-called semi-collusive agreement and lead to more decentralized wage negotiations.
Introduction
In December 2005, Germany's president Horst Köhler, called for 'worker-friendly'labor reforms, especially pro…t sharing. "In an era of globalization sharing the capital means can help to narrow the growing divide between the rich and the poor," Köhler said. "Today employers and employees have to realize that they are in the same boat as part of a company facing worldwide competition" (Köhler (2005) ).
This paper addresses the question whether pro…t sharing is advantageous for unions, …rms, consumers, and overall welfare under di¤erent wage bargaining regimes. Whilst in the United States and the UK variable pay schemes are common 1 , more ‡exible remuneration schemes have only become more popular in Germany in the mid 1990s. One question is whether these differences can result from di¤erences in labor market institutions. In the Anglo-American part of the world wages are usually bargained on a decentralized …rm level between workers' councils and …rms. In contrast, in Germany, 2 Austria, and Scandinavian countries negotiations take place either on an industry or the national level. Unions and employer associations agree on wages binding for the whole industry or even country. At the same time, pro…t sharing between employers and employees is unusual. Whether this is sheer coincidence or a result of institutional di¤erences is the question we try to shed light on in this paper. Therefore, we examine the decision whether to bargain over classical wage contracts or to bargain over contingent pay contracts within a framework of oligopolistic competition in the product market. Furthermore, we take two institutional arrangements into account: remuneration is either negotiated under a centralized or a decentralized setting.
We show that in a decentralized bargaining system …rms and unions collectively prefer classical wage contracts as a convention for all …rm-union pairs in the sector. However, due to a prisoners' dilemma, single …rm-union pairs have incentives to deviate and to enter into pro…t sharing contracts. The same is true for centralized industry relations: classical wages are in the collective interest of both parties. Furthermore, we now …nd an agreement on central classical wage contracts to be relatively stable against a deviation when only …rm-speci…c classical contracts are feasible. We also show this deviating from the semi-collusive agreement is more likely if …rms and unions are allowed to negotiate over a base wage as well as a pro…t share coe¢ cient. In this particular case, …rms and unions gain by a deviation. As a consequence, negotiations take place on a decentralized level. The scope of bargaining includes now a base wage as well as a sharing coe¢ cient. Hence, depending on union strength, oligopoly size, and collusively acting …rm-union pairs this result arises when the union's bargaining power exceeds a critical value, decreasing with oligopoly size and number of outsiders of the agreement. Apparently, centralized bargaining systems will become uncommon within larger oligopolies or with more outsiders when the scope of bargaining is expanded to a contingent pay.
However, pro…t sharing is welfare enhancing under the assumption that production and consumption take place in the same country. It can be interpreted as an instrument to introduce e¢ cient-bargaining (where unions and …rms negotiate over wages as well as employment).
3 Under e¢ cient-bargaining unions and …rms agree on a wage-employment combination beside the demand curve where the indi¤erence curves tangent, and therefore it is called "e¢ cient". When pro…t sharing is not feasible and unions only bargain over a base wage, employment can only be enhanced by lowering wages. With pro…t sharing unions can agree on a low base wage, and this reduces …rms' marginal costs. As a consequence more workers are employed. Joint-pro…t maximization between …rm and union occurs here. Additionally, unions are able to extract rents through a pro…t sharing wage coe¢ cient. Put di¤erently: …rst unions and …rms maximize the sum of their pro…ts negotiating a low base wages and afterward these pro…ts are distributed by the share coe¢ cient. This is the same e¤ect appearing with e¢ cient-bargaining negotiations but in a more indirect way, here. Regarding to realism pro…t sharing negotiations are maybe a more tractable way to implement welfare enhancing e¤ects of e¢ cient bargaining than negotiations over wages and employment.
To encapsulate our …ndings: we can show centralized wage systems to be relatively stable against deviating to decentralized wage bargaining over classical wages. Nevertheless, if there is the possibility to negotiate over pro…t shares as well, the probability rises that the semicollusive agreement collapses. This implies a noteworthy result for countries with centralized bargaining: once pro…t sharing is feasible, the parameter space is enlarged where the industry speci…c remuneration scheme is replaced by a decentralized one is enlarged. This is in line with empirical research. For example, Kurdelbusch (2002) concludes in her empirical study for German industrial relations: "Until now company speci…c pay systems have coexisted alongside collective bargaining on pay. As yet, variable wage components have not substituted for basic pay. Nevertheless, the emergence of company speci…c remuneration systems is reinforcing a decentralization of wage bargaining and the variation in employment relations. This might have major implications for trade unions and workplace representation."
Even though there is a broard literature on pro…t sharing in general 4 , the literature on pro…t sharing as a strategic instrument in oligopolistic markets is relatively thin.Notable exemptions are Stewart (1989) and Fung (1989) , 5 which both examine the e¤ects of pro…t sharing on oligopolistic competition. Stewart (1989) shows that a monopolistic …rm never implements a pro…t sharing contract, but under perfect competition in the upstream labor market. The reverse is true for an oligopolistic …rm: pro…t sharing is always optimal for them. Fung (1989) introduces two …rm speci…c unions setting the base wage while one of the …rms choose the pro…t sharing parameter. He assumes the pro…t sharing …rm to have lower marginal costs and therefore to increase output while the output of the …rm that does not set a contingent pay declines. Consequently, the pro…t sharing …rm gains whereas the other loses through pro…t sharing. All in all, pro…t sharing results in a lower product price and higher employment. However, Bensaïd and GaryBobo (1991) develop a model without negotiations in a decentralized wage-setting regime on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In the …rst stage, a pro…t sharing scheme is o¤ered to the employees. The workers can reject or accept the …rm´s proposal, negotiations about a base wage and a share coe¢ cient are not feasible. Refusing the contingent pay o¤ered results in a wage equal to the 'market wage'in the competitive sector. The …nding is a subgame-perfect equilibrium where all …rms simultaneously implement a share-contract. Hence, our results re…ne the outcome of the decentralized bargaining regime of Bensaïd and Gary-Bobo by the use of negotiations instead of take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. Probably Sørensen's model (see Sørensen (1992) ) is most closely connected to our paper, analyzing a special case of our model with decentralized negotiations in a duopoly framework. He examines the outcome of a Cournot game between two union-…rm pairs maximizing their utility. He …nds pro…t sharing to be pro…table for the …rm as long as the union does not have 'too much power'which is similar to our model and our …ndings with n = 2 and decentralized bargaining.Another rather small strand of literature related to our model is the one concerning the strategic choice of bargaining agenda in unionized oligopolies. Yang (1995) , Vannini and Bughin (2000) , and Petrakis and Vlassis (2000) should be mentioned here. All papers focus on the question whether …rms and unions prefer e¢ cient-bargaining or right-to-manage negotiations. However, while pro…t sharing is an indirect instrument to enable unions to in ‡uence employment through the base wages, our paper studies a related question.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we outline the basic model in the decentralized bargaining system and analyze the stability of the classical remuneration agreement in the next section. In Section 3 we set up the theoretical model for centralized wage negotiations and analyze di¤erences in the stability of the wage-setting regimes, focussing on the in ‡uence of pro…t sharing. We conclude in the last section.
Decentralized wage negotiations (D)
2.1 Basic Setup
The game
We analyze a noncooperative three stage game. In stage 1, each …rm faces a single monopoly trade union and both decide whether to bargain over a basic pay in a classical system or over a share coe¢ cient and a base rate in a pro…t sharing regime. Only when the particular …rm and the particular union agree on a pro…t sharing contract pro…t sharing is established. Otherwise, if either the union or the …rm prefers a classical base pay, classical wage contracts are negotiated. Afterwards, in stage 2 negotiations over wages take place via a decentralized Nash-bargaining process. In stage 3, the …rms unilaterally choose their product market quantities in Cournot fashion.
Firms'and unions'objectives
There are n …rms and n unions (indexed by i = 1; :::; n). Each …rm produces a homogeneous good with labor as the only input. One unit of labor is used to produce one unit of output. Thus, we can discuss output and employment interchangeably.
Firm i's pro…t in the classical system is given by
is the inverse demand function and b i the base wage negotiated between …rm i and union i. Let X = P n i=1 x i denote the total production of all …rms, and x i be the individual output. If a …rm and a union agree to negotiate a pro…t sharing contract a …rm's pro…t is de…ned as
with a i being the share coe¢ cient, 0 a i 1. The representative union is risk neutral and has a rent-maximization objective. Hence U i is the utility of the union and is represented by
where w denotes the competitive wage in a non-unionized labor market and t i the employees' contractual wage rate. Let the total wages per worker be t i = b i in the classical system and t i = b i +a i (p b i ) in the pro…t sharing regime. With pro…t sharing, the union has the control over two independent variables: the share coe¢ cient a i and the basic pay b i . This di¤ers signi…cantly from a …xed contract where the union tries to achieve a high level of U i via the negotiation of a basic pay b i only.
In this right-to-manage model neither the …rm nor the union can obtain a reservation payo¤ so that the Nash bargaining product is given by
Here, 0 c 1 represents the union's and 1 c the …rm's bargaining power, respectively. We solve the model backwards, …rst we analyze stage 3 where we examine the …rms'optimal production decision for a given set of wage contracts. For simplicity we shall restrict attention only to solutions in pure strategies. Then, we consider the second stage and obtain the wage contracts which result from the Nash-wage-bargaining, again only solutions in pure strategies are under consideration. Here we have to distinguish two cases: …rst, we assume that all …rms and unions negotiate in the classical system. Then, we solve the model for a pro…t sharing system and compare the …ndings. We can show that …rm-union pairs are collectively better o¤ if they bargain only over a base wage in an industry speci…c 'semi-collusive agreement'. Analyzing asymmetric situations is the last step: is it bene…cial for some union-…rm pairs in the industry to leave this semi-collusive agreement and negotiate a pro…t sharing contract?
2.2 Decentralized negotiations in a classical wage system (D cs )
In this section, a basic pay is negotiable whilst pro…t sharing is not feasible.
Stage 3: The product market game In the classical system and under the assumption of Cournot-Nash competition, di¤erentiation of (1) with respect to x i yields the …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization by the representative …rm i.
This equation can now be solved to obtain the output of each …rm (and the industry output) as a reaction function with respect to the unions'chosen wages.
Stage 2: The market game In the second stage, each union-…rm pair will bargain over a base wage to maximize their rents. Substituting Eqs. (1) ; (2) ; (4) and (6) into Equ. (5) and di¤erentiating with respect to b i . Here, we bene…t from the fact of a symmetric game, substituting P n j6 =i b j = (n 1) b i after the derivation. Thus, we obtain the equilibrium base wage for the representative …rm i
Further substitution then yields the equilibrium levels for prices, pro…ts, and union utility:
Hence, welfare can be de…ned as W = n i + nU i + consumer surplus and the explicit expression of welfare is
Unsurprisingly, the …xed salary b i is positive and some comparative statics show that the basic pay increases in unions strength and declines in oligopoly size. 7 Examining the welfare change due to a rise in union bargaining power we obtain: 8 Proposition 1 In a decentralized classical bargaining regime welfare W declines with stronger unions, dW dc < 0. This e¤ect stems from the fact that the union can charge an increasingly high wage rate with a rise in c. With c = 1 the union can set a monopolistic wage leading to a reduction of production in the oligopolistic downstream market. For 0 < c < 1 the problem is reduced but welfare is still not maximal; at c = 0 welfare would be at the maximum level.
Decentralized negotiations about a pro…t sharing scheme (D ps )
Unions and …rms maximize their rents by choosing a base wage and a share coe¢ cient in this section.
Stage 3: The product market game In this regime, the …rm maximizes (3) with respect to x i and we obtain the same …rm reaction function as in the classical system (6).
Stage 2: The labor market game In the …rst stage each union-…rm pair negotiates over the basic pay b i and the share coe¢ cient a i . Union and …rm choose a i and b i to achieve a high level of Eq. (5) where Eqs. (3) and (4) are the pro…t and utility functions, respectively. 9 This yields equilibrium base wage, share coe¢ cient, and contractual wage rate:
Substituting these equations back in the price, pro…t, and utility function we obtain:
7 db=dc > 0 and db=dn < 0 8 All proofs are presented in the appendix. 9 For a deeper understanding of the changes in the remuneration reaction functions we refer to Sørensen (1992) .
Using eqs. (16), (17) ; and (18), it is possible to denote W as:
The pro…t sharing regime entails interesting results. The share coe¢ cient a i of the remuneration scheme is positive, smaller than unity, and increases with union strength. Notably b i is independent of the union bargaining power c. The union achieves a higher level of utility by negotiating a higher a i if she can strengthen her position. The derivation of the sharing coe¢ cient shows a constant increase of a i due to a rise in c.
In other words: in smaller industries unions gain more from an increased bargaining parameter. Interestingly, b i can decrease and become negative for some parameter constellations. In these cases, …rms are faced with negative marginal cost, making them very aggressive in the Cournot product market game. Thereby, they produce higher output which yields a higher demand for workers. Unions gain by increased employment and higher pro…t of the …rms due to a i .
Proposition 2 In a decentralized pro…t sharing regime welfare W is independent of union strength c.
When …rms and unions negotiate about pro…t share and basic pay welfare W is independent of union power. The intuition for this result can be described by the two parts of the contractual wage: the base rate b i is set to an optimal level by the …rm and union. Both parties maximize the 'cake'they bargain over which is welfare enhancing. However, the strength of the union and the …rm in ‡uences how the cake is divided. This leads to welfare neutral transfers meaning that the level of welfare does not change.
The classical wage system vs. pro…t sharing scheme (Stage 1)
The di¤erences between a classical wage contract in the oligopoly and a pro…t sharing contract can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3
1. Firms prefer the classical wage contract.
2. Unions in duopolies favor the pro…t sharing scheme for c > 2 3 . In larger oligopolies unions gain a higher utility in the classical regime.
3. Total wages in the classical wage system are higher than the basic wages and higher than the total contractual wage per worker under a pro…t sharing regime.
Pro…t sharing results in higher welfare.
The pro…t sharing regime reduces the base wage rate so that …rms produce with lower marginal costs. As a consequence, output rises 10 and price decreases. Lower production costs and higher 1 0 This e¤ect of pro…t sharing and its macroeconomic consequences has been made widely known through the work of Weitzman. For an introduction, see Weitzman (1984) or for a summery OECD (1995) . In his model of monopolistic competition (Weitzman (1985) ), he shows an advantage of pro…t sharing with regard to unemployment and in ‡ation without attention of trade unions'in ‡uences. quantity cannot compensate the …rm for the price decreases and extraction of rents through a i by the union. Unions also su¤er from pro…t sharing. More workers are employed, but the contract wage decreases by so much that the union's utility declines. Basically, these e¤ects arise from the fact that, as a consequence of pro…t sharing, more output is produced. This is individually rational because marginal costs b i decreases, but …rms as a whole are faced with a price decrease. The unions earn a lower basic pay while more workers are employed and obtain a share of the pro…t. In view of the fact that pro…ts decline when all pairs play 'pro…t sharing' a i does not increase overall utility.
Regarding welfare, pro…t sharing has positive e¤ects. This results from an increase in consumer welfare. In our closed economy model production and consumption take place in the same country. If, however, only a share of consumer surplus is part of domestic welfare the positive wefare e¤ect of contingent pay will decrease. Especially for a country which mainly exports its commodities produced it is questionable whether a change of the bargaining regime from a classical to a pro…t sharing one is welfare enhancing. Additionally, it must be taken into consideration that usually employment rises whilst wage payments per worker decline.
It should be clari…ed again that pro…t sharing in a right-to-manage model could be considered as a device to introduce e¢ cient-bargaining.
11 While with e¢ cient-bargaining unions and …rms bargain directly over wages as well as employment, in the right-to-manage approach …rms unilaterally determine employment. Without pro…t sharing unions in right-to-manage negotiations can only enhance employment by lowering wages. However, when unions negotiate in pro…t sharing regimes they can agree on a low base wage to reduce …rms'marginal costs leading to a high rate of employment. Simultaneously, unions can achieve the same utility level by extracting rents through a high pro…t sharing coe¢ cient. Even if employment is determined more indirectly‚ pro…t-sharing-right-to-manage negotiations'than in e¢ cient bargaining these negotiations are maybe a more tractable way than e¢ cient bargaining to implement the positive e¤ects of e¢ cient bargaining in reality.
To sum up our …ndings: unions and …rms collectively prefer the ine¢ cient classical contract over more e¢ cient pro…t sharing schemes in most cases. This due to the negative competition externality in Cournot competition. If both …rms and unions are monopolists they would strictly prefer pro…t sharing. Strikingly, pro…t sharing enlarges these negative Cournot competition or Prisoner's Dilemma e¤ects. In our model we assume homogeneous products. Therefore, it may be desirable to extend our model to heterogeneous products. With more di¤erentiated products our …rm-union pairs approach the monopolistic situation and the negative competition e¤ect is reduced. A threshold value for product di¤erentiation may exist, where for more heterogeneous products unions and …rms would prefer pro…t sharing. Unfortunately, the mathematical complexitiy of our model does not allow us to …nd an exact solution for the threshold values.
However, if unions and …rms could collectively write binding contracts they would collude over the contract form and bargain over classical wage rates. Here, the 'semi-collusive agreement'involves the consent about the contract form. This contrasts the cartel literature discussing mostly quantity or price agreements. Instead, our model is probably more in line with the literature on semi-collusion where …rms act in collusive action, maximizing joint pro…ts by choosing one strategic variable while competing in the other variables. To avoid misunderstandings: the agreement in our model covers only the scope of bargaining.
12 All unions and …rms choose classical contracts in the …rst stage since this leads to higher pro…ts for every single union and …rm in the industry. This can be understood as a special case of joint pro…t maximization. However, the product market is still competitive. For the rest of the paper we refer to this kind of behavior as 'semi-collusion'like Fershtman and Muller (1986) .
Hitherto, we have not analysed the stability of this semi-collusive agreement. Does a union…rm pair have an incentive to become an outsider and negotiate a pro…t sharing contract? We follow D'Aspremont, Jaquemin, Gabszewicz, and Weymark (1983) and assume a cartel or semicollusive agreement to be stable if and only if a union-…rm pair inside does not …nd it desirable to exit (internal stability) and another pair of …rm and union does not …nd it desirable to join the agreement (external stability). To proof cartel instability it is therefore su¢ cient to demonstrate that the cartel is either externally or internally unstable.
Stability of the semi-collusive agreement (D ts )
To answer this question, we investigate how …rm pro…ts and union utility vary if a …rm-union pair leaves the semi-collusive agreement. At the outset, k of the n …rms bargain semi-collusive over a classical wage contract while n k union-…rm pairs are outsiders of this agreement. We obtain the equilibrium pro…ts and utility levels for …rms and unions negotiating in the classical system ( i ; U i ) and under a pro…t sharing regime ( r ; U r ). Subsequently, we assume an additional pair to introduce pro…t sharing. Now, k 1 …rms and unions participate in the semi-collusive agreement while n k + 1 …rm-union pairs are outsiders. The equilibrium outcomes are given by and U +1 r , respectively. In other words, if the union as well as the …rm bene…t by deviating we assume that both will agree on a contingent contract. Firstly, we focus on the computations for the number of pairs k acting in a semi-collusive behavior. Afterwards, similar computations can be made for a semi-collusive agreement with k 1 participants, but we summarize the equilibrium outcomes in the appendix only.
For k semi-colluding pairs we assume a linear product demand
where X = P k i=1 x i is the cumulated output of the …rms with a classical contract and Y = P n k r=1 y r the production of all …rms paying a pro…t sharing scheme to their employees. The contractual wages, the pro…t, and the utility functions can now be written as
From the pro…t functions (23) we can derive the …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximization in the product market game. In order to obtain the equilibrium levels of output for each representative …rm we solve the …rst order conditions. This yields the following representative labor demand functions:
In the labor market game, each of the k …rm-union pairs in the classical remuneration system bargains just the …xed wage rate b i maximizing the Nash-bargaining solution
Similarly, the other n k …rm-union pairs will choose a r and b r by di¤erentiating Solving the Nash bargaining problem we …nd the equilibrium contracts. Hence, we can provide expressions for the price, the …rm's pro…t, and the union's utility.
In order to answer the question whether or not the semi-collusive outcome is stable we have to solve for the product market and the labor market game again. Henceforth, we assume n k + 1 …rm-union pairs to negotiate a pro…t sharing scheme while k 1 choose the classical system. Analogous calculations yield the results presented in the appendix.
In the following section, we consider the comparative static properties of the model, focusing on semi-collusive stability.
Comparative statics 2.6.1 Firms'pro…ts and unions'utility
First, consider the decision of one …rm-union pair in an industry with all …rms and unions bargaining in the classical system. Is it preferable for a pair to leave the agreement? We have analyze the situation for all k = n to k = 1 …rm-union pairs. In other words: is it advantageous for every n k + 1 …rm-union pair to become a deviant on the assumption that the other k 1 pairs act in a semi-collusive manner?
Whilst the unions unambiguously prefer to be outsiders, the situation for the …rms alters with a variation in k. Therefore, a general examination for 1 k n for the …rms is worthwhile. For the simple reason that the function of the pro…tability to be an outsider is of seventh degree nature, an explicit expression can not be found. Instead, we present numerical solutions to receive some impressions on the instability if k varies: The table shows the threshold values of the bargaining strength. Lower values indicate an incentive for the …rm to become an outsider. To set an example: for n = 5 the …rst …rm, k = 5, prefers deviating if c < 0:668 96. The second …nds it pro…table for c < 0:869 26, the third for c < 0:907 19. Even though we cannot provide a general proof, two facts are obvious: the likelihood for a deviation is rising in oligopoly size and number of outsiders. This result stems from the aggressive behavior of the outsiders. Firms and unions in the semi-collusive agreement behave less aggressive by producing a smaller output arising from higher marginal costs. Thereby, to participate in the agreement becomes increasingly harmful whensoever another pair leaves the semi-collusive agreement and acts aggressively.
Summary 1
The instability of the collusive agreement increases in oligopoly size and number of outsiders and declines in union power.
This situation is a typical prisoners' dilemma. All favor a semicollusive behavior but the incentive to deviate is predominant. However, empirically it is very rare to …nd c > 0:5 13 indicating union power being larger than …rm power. So a agreement instability will be common in most industries.
Wages
For the sake of completeness and to gain additional answers, we show the variation of wages following the change in the semi-collusive agreement structure.
Therefore, contractual pay before and after defecting must be compared. For the …rst …rm-union negotiating classical wage contracts, the contractual wage rate t +1 r is lower than the basic remuneration b i .
14 The …rm has to pay lower wages that is to say a worker in the …rst …rm will earn less if the …rm becomes an outsider. Conversely, when considering the last …rm and union bargaining over a pro…t sharing scheme, t +1 r is unambiguously higher than b i . 15 Wages for the last pair rise. We have to …nd a critical k where wages inside and outside are equivalent. This threshold value is:
By doing some comparative statics we achieve the appreciable result that only the …rst pair leaving the semi-collusive agreement pays lower wages per worker. The derivation of k with respect to c and n yields:
Hence, because k is an increasing function in n and a declining one in c, we choose n = 2 and c = 1 to …nd a relatively small k . Still in this case k = 1:625: In other words, wages decrease only for the …rst pair deviating. When the next …rm-union pair negotiates a share contract, wages increase. A more general analysis shows:
Proposition 4
1. Total wages for the …rst union-…rm pair deviating are lower than the base wage before deviating.
2. If another pair switches to pro…t sharing their total pay rises.
3. Nevertheless, the total wages in a stable semi-collusive agreement with all …rm-union pairs participating are unambiguously higher than total pays after deviating.
1 3 See Veugelers (1989) and Bughin (1996) for empirical evidence.
The …rst part of the proposition is a result of the increase in employment if the …rst …rm leaves the agreement. For the …rst pair behaving no-collusively the rents created are transferred to the union through a higher y +1 r . Remembering part 3 of the proposition we know b i to be at its maximum in a 'full'semi-collusive agreement so that a transfer of rents through a higher remuneration per worker is not optimal. For the remaining members the semi-collusive remuneration per worker and employment fall when the number of collusive pairs declines. Consequently, being an outsider leads to a higher employment for later deviants albeit pays per worker rise, too. However, unions of later deviants extract rents by a higher remuneration, but the pay per worker is smaller than in a 'complete' industry speci…c semi-collusive agreement. The fall in overall wages can be explained by the rise in employment. The union tries to achieve a high utility being a product of employment and remuneration rent per worker. Therefore the pro…t sharing results in lower marginal costs by reducing the …xed wage leading to more employment and increased union utility. As a consequence, unions with a constant bargaining strength can accept a lower remuneration per worker due to a higher employment, maximizing their utility.
It is worth noting that a i is independent of k. That is to say, all unions receive the same share of pro…ts no matter whether they deviate …rst or are the last outsider. In contrast, the base wage is increasing in k so that the base wage is decreasing for the deviants.
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Thus far, the analysis told us that …rms and unions always prefer an oligopoly speci…c classical wage system if n > 2, or if n = 2 and c < 2 3 . However, a pro…t sharing scheme would maximize welfare. While testing for semi-collusive agreement stability we …nd a higher agreement instability with a rise in oligopoly size, number of outsider, and …rms'strength. For an empirically validated size of c, unions and …rms gain by leaving the agreement. This leads to a prisoners'dilemma for unions and …rms. Nevertheless, this dilemma can be welfare enhancing as a consequence of an increase in consumer surplus.
Centralized wage negotiating (C)
In this alternative bargaining scenario, a centralized union bargains over an industry speci…c wage with an employers' confederation. Firms as well as unions act in a collusive behavior, trying to maximize their rents in the labor market. The product market is still oligopolistic, and …rms behave as competitors.
The structure of this section is as follows. First, we modify the basic model, assuming a central union and a central employers' association and summarize the results for negotiations in the classical system. Second, outcomes are compared with the results for decentralized …rm speci…c bargaining with pro…t sharing. We obtain an advantage for …rms and unions to behave collusively. To avoid misunderstandings: here, the semi-collusive agreement contains the arrangement on a central bargaining and classical wage contracts. The test of stability is separated in two steps show in …gure 3. The …rst step analyzing the pro…tability to deviate from central classical wage negotiations to decentralized classical negotiations shows a relatively low incentive for unions. Apparently, this is consistent with the fact that in Germany the centralized wage bargaining is relatively stable. Nevertheless, if the scope of bargaining changes as well to a share pay in the second step, the semi-collusive agreement becomes unstable. They desire to negotiate pro…t sharing schemes; resulting in a prisoners'dilemma again. 
Centralized negotiations in a classical wage system (C cs )
It is straightforward to derive the reaction functions assuming all …rms to have the same industry speci…c labor costs. Each …rm maximizes pro…ts
where the linear inverse demand function is given by p = maxf0; A Xg and by producing a …rm speci…c output of
which yields an industry production of
From these expressions, we derive the industry pro…t
Assuming that the industry speci…c union objective can be captured by the functional form
with t being the industry …xed salary rate b the Nash bargaining solution B = U c 1 c can be rearranged to:
Di¤erentiating with respect to b yields the …ndings in the appendix. It is worth noting that the base wage rate is independent of the industry size. 17 This is due to the fact that an industry union and an industry employers'association are bargaining about the remunerations. Furthermore, welfare decreases with a rise in union strength.
Is a semi-cartel agreement advantageous for …rms and unions?
Hitherto, we computed equilibrium results for central bargaining with classical contracts in the last section and the outcomes for the decentralized pro…t sharing bargaining were presented in section 2:3. Hence, we now examine the condition among which it is bene…cial for an industry to bargain a centralized base wage or a decentralized pro…t sharing contract.
For an individual …rm the pro…t with a sharing contract exceeds the pro…t with an industry speci…c base wage contract if
18 This is not the case. Thus, it is always 1 7 db (Ccs) =dn = 0: Dhillon and Petrakis (2002) provide su¢ cient conditions under which the base wage is independent of product market features (like the industry size) and bargaining institutions. Referring to Dhillon and Petrakis (2002) , with centralized wage bargains between an employers' confederation and a single industry union the negotiated wage turns out to be the same under e¢ cient-bargaining and right-to-manage. 1 8 [(A w) 2 4(c + n cn + n 3 n 4 cn 3 + cn 4 1) c 2 2c 2 n 2 c 2 n 4 ]=[4 n 2 + 1
The semi-collusive agreement "central negotiations and classical wages" is more profitable for firms and unions than "decentral negotiations and profit-sharing". But is it stable against deviation?
Step 1 Step 2 Figure 3: Stable against deviation?
preferable for a …rm to be an insider of the semi-collusive agreement. Similarly, U i (C ps ) > U i (C cs ) must be true for all unions to make pro…t sharing worthwhile. However,
19 Consequently, both parties bene…t from the industry collusion. Nevertheless, we have to analyze semi-collusive agreement stability for individual deviation again. Top shed light on the reason why a semi-collusive agreement results in higher pro…ts and utility, we explain two separate steps: First, we examine whether …rm-union pairs would break away from an industry speci…c classical wage contract if only a …rm speci…c base wage contract 20 without pro…t sharing is achievable. In a second step we analyze the pro…tability of a change to decentralized pro…t sharing contracts.
Step 1: are decentralized classical wages pro…table?
A prevalent …nding in the literature on static oligopolies 21 is a disadvantage for substitutable workers being organized in di¤erent unions. We can con…rm this result by …nding a collusive wage bargaining to be in the interest of the …rst union as long as its bargaining strength is not extremely high or oligopoly very large . 22 Even in a dynamic analysis the union prefers the centralized bargaining as can be seen on the left of the function 23 in Figure 4 where U +1 r (C dcs ) < U i (C dcs ) is true under the line. All in all, the semi-collusive agreement is relatively stable against a union infringement. To elucidate our proceeding: we demonstrate a disadvantage for the …rst union to deviate on the agreement for a grand parameter space. In consequence, there is no important reason to examine the incentive for the second or third union en detail because this situation will only rarely appear. Hence, for the sake of completeness, we present numerical …ndings in appendix D, showing a decline in the incentive of unions for a later deviation.
Contrarily, but in line with the literature, we …nd it unambiguously in the interest of the …rst …rm to bargain over a …rm speci…c contract. 24 As long as the agreement of …rm and union is a 1 9 [(w A) 2 c c + 4n 2n 4 + 2cn 2 + cn 4 2 ]=[4 n 2 + 1 2 (n + 1)] < 0 2 0 Results can be found in appendix D.1. 2 1 See e.g. Horn and Wolinsky (1988) or Gürtzgen (2003) for a more detailed analysis. 
Conclusion 1
The semi-collusive agreement 'central classical wages'is relatively stable against a deviation to 'decentralized classical wages'.
Step 2: are decentralized pro…t sharing schemes pro…table?
25
Is it pro…table for one …rm-union pair to leave the agreement? Deviating from the industry speci…c contract means that the employers leave their association and negotiate decentralized with a …rm speci…c union about pro…t sharing wage contracts.
Again, we are confronted with the problem to give a general solution for this parameter constellations so numerical computations are necessary and are presented in Table 2 for …rms  and Table 3 for unions. Unfortunately, the pro…tability function for …rms deviating is of ninth degree nature, and the results are non-monotonic. The values presented indicate the threshold union strength necessary to make a deviation of …rms not pro…table. As long as the strength of the union is lower than this threshold value …rms will deviate. The situation for the unions is less complicated. Whilst it is questionable if the …rst union deviates, as soon as an outsider exists all other unions unambiguously want to become an outsiders. The thresholds for the …rst unions are stated in Table 3 . The unions prefer decentralized bargaining for lower values than these thresholds. Evidently, only for the …rst union it is questionable whether a deviation is advantageous. As soon as one union-…rm pair does not participate in the semi-collusive agreement all other unions will deviate, too. With reference to the empirical …ndings of Bughin (1996) and Veugelers (1989) the …rms will not act collusively. In touch with reality we can ascertain that all …rm-union pairs will deviate once the …rst pair has deviated. For the …rst pair the pro…tability crucially depends on union strength. To see it from a di¤erent perspective: as soon as a single competitor in the product market is not a member of the agreement anymore all union-…rm pairs will deviate for an empirically validated value of c. This will be the case if we extend this model to an international aspect. When we assume that one …rm in the product market is located in a foreign country and has to bargain pro…t sharing contracts with a foreign union, the domestic agreement will break down. Semi-collusive agreement stability is therefore very improbable.
Conclusion 2 A semi-collusive agreement of centralized classical wage bargaining is very unstable against a deviation to decentralized pro…t sharing contracts.
To sum up our …ndings:
Summary 2
1. The union-…rm-semi-collusive agreement is relatively stable against deviating in the centralized bargaining scenario when only classical contracts are allowed. The stability of the agreement is declining in oligopoly size and union strength.
2. The semi-collusive agreement stability declines considerably more when the …rm-union pairs have the possibility to sign pro…t sharing contracts, too.
To clarify this result: basically, workers being substitutes for …rms favor to be organized in a single union and not to be faced with internal competition. Hence, incentives to deviate on centralized wage bargaining are low for workers as long as only a basic pay is negotiated. In contrast, with the possibility to bargain over a contingent and a basic pay unions leave the semi-collusive agreement. This can be an advantage for a union as it grants a competitive gain to their …rms exceeding the disadvantages from internal competition.
Apparently, unions in our model are confronted with a dilemma: on the one hand, it is an advantage for substitutable workers to be organized in a single union in the centralized system. Nonetheless, they can only negotiate over the value of the basic pay to achieve a high employment and wages. On the other hand, in the decentralized pro…t sharing system unions have two instruments to attain their two goals, being an advantage for the pair deviating but the workers are engaged in competition.
Conclusion and further remarks
This paper analyzed the emergence of pro…t sharing contracts when wages are negotiated in a centralized or a decentralized bargaining system. Whilst we assume a union strength being smaller than the …rm's bargaining strength we have shown the following: in a decentralized bargaining system pro…t sharing in an industry is not in the collective interest of …rms and unions. Nevertheless, individual …rm union pairs …nd it pro…table to leave the 'non-pro…t-sharing'semicollusive agreement which is welfare enhancing due to an increase in consumer surplus. Similarly, a centralized system gains by classical 'non-pro…t-sharing'contracts. It can be shown that deviating to decentralized classical contracts will not be an equilibrium solution for smaller industries. For instance, if the union is strong with c = 0:5 more than n = 45 …rms must compete in the industry to make deviating advantageous. In contrast, unions and …rms will remain outside the agreement if the scope of bargaining includes a pro…t sharing coe¢ cient and union power exceeds a critical value falling in n and number of outsiders.
On the assumption that increasing globalization can be approximated by an increase in n the semi-collusive agreement becomes even less e¢ cient and pro…t sharing more likely. Consequently, …rms and unions in countries with centralized wage bargaining have an incentive to negotiate decentralized pro…t sharing contracts in the future. Especially a competitor in a foreign country not being able to join the agreement but acting in the same market leads to an increased incentive to the participants to become deviants. For instance, IBM Germany was a member of the employers association and no earlier than 1994 they quit ao as to negotiate on a decentralized level with the workers'council over a pro…t sharing contract. Empirically, Kurdelbusch (2002) shows that companies which operate internationally have a greater incentive to deviate from the centralized wage bargaining and agree over pro…t sharing schemes with workers' councils. She she writes: "Multinational companies play a vanguard role in the di¤usion of variable pay. (...) The increase [of contingent pay] can be explained by the growing internationalization of product and capital markets as it is the multinational companies with a high percentage of foreign sales and a strong orientation toward shareholder value that are most likely to use ‡exible pay." With respect to welfare we have found that …rms and unions su¤er from the change, but due to price decreases consumers gain. Total welfare increases as a result of sharing contracts. Pro…t sharing can be understood as an instrument to introduce the welfare enhancing e¤ects of e¢ cient bargaining in a much more indirect way: unions are able to negotiate low base wages to enlarge employment and extract rents through a high share coe¢ cient. High employment is equal to high production and therefore advantageous for consumers. For export countries, in contrast, the situation may di¤er if consumers are located outside the home country. It is doubtful whether Horst Köhler's advice to negotiate pro…t sharing contacts increases national welfare if it is applied in export sectors. However, it is also important to note that employment rises.
This model provides …rst insights into the e¤ects of pro…t sharing as a strategic instrument for …rms and unions. Future research could explicitly model globalization processes and their impact. In addition, di¤erent assumptions about demand and risk attitudes may be applied. When we allow …rms to make losses for some periods, results may also change. Possibly, risk-avers workers su¤er from pro…t sharing even though the expected wage remains unchanged. It seems reasonable to suppose that these workers will ask for a risk premium. Additionally, linking this result to the literature on management incentives may be interesting. The bargaining solutions should change when managers, being representatives of the …rm's owners, bargain over wages, maximizing their own utility. 26 Possibly, managers will not deviate from the semi-collusive agreement if their own wages decline once pro…t sharing agreements are concluded. must be positive if she prefers pro…t sharing. (18) (11) is positive if = c + 2n cn + 2n 2 2n 3 cn 2 + cn 3 + 2 > 0: Only for n = 2 and c > 2 3 this is true, otherwise is negative. 3. By subtracting it can be shown that the base rate in the classical wage regime always exceeds the base rate and the contractual wage rate under the pro…t sharing regime ((7) > (15) > (14)).
4. The di¤erence between the share contract and the classical system can be calculated by subtracting (19) (12) = 2 (A w) 2 n 2 c + 2n + n 2 + n 3 (c + n 1) (cn 2n c) 2 (n 2 + 1) 2 (n + 1) 2 ; being positive.
A.4 Proposition 4
Proof. Wages decline for the …rst pair only if n k < 1, or 2n (n 1) + n 2 2n 1 c 2 (c + n 1) n < 0
The salary in a stable semi-collusive agreement b i (n = k) with k = n participants is higher than wages after deviating t +1 r for all n and k if
We can rewrite the condition as:
(A w) c (c + n 1) (2n (n k) + c (n 1)) c (n + 1) 2 + 2n 2 (n k) + 2n (n ck) + 2kn (c + n (2 c)) > 0
B Test of Cartel stability (D ts )
B.1 k members of the semi-collusive agreement
The union-…rm pairs bargaining over a contingent pay are indexed with r, pairs negotiating a classical wage with i. D.1.1 k members of the semi-collusive agreement b (C dcs ) = Ac (c + 2n) + (c 2) 2n (k 1 n) + c k
